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“Every violence appears ‘in context’.
Violence exists only within a framework.
Violence is a product of circumstances.”
[Κάθε βία εμφανίζεται εν καταστάσει.
Η βία υπάρχει μόνον εντός ενός πλαισίου.
Η βία είναι ένα συγκυριακό προϊόν.]
(Labica, 2014: 60).
During the last decade in Europe, and more specifically in what is regarded as the
European South,1 it was observed that the extreme version of austerity politics
employed to overcome the crisis of 2008 unleashed strong reactions including
violent protests, clashes with the police, scuffles between political groups and acts
of vandalism against public property among other acts of opposition. As widely
reported by academics, analysts, journalists and activists the Greek context did
not stand as an exception. Since 2010, when the Greek government of George
Papandreou officially announced that Greece is facing a severe crisis, the numer‐
ous changes witnessed in mainstream politics and the overturn of established
political discourses marked also the manifestation of a social conflict which in
many instances was experienced or, expressed as violence.
Mainly due to poor GDP growth, excess government spending and significant rise
of budget and trade deficits, Greece was called in 2009 to face one of the most
severe crises in its history. In co-ordination and under the supervision of
TROIKA,2 the Greek governments in power since 2010 signed in total three mem‐
oranda of co-operation3 which required the implementation of numerous meas‐
ures regarded as necessary for the stabilization of the economy. The measures
were implemented in packages over the years and concerned almost every sector
that could influence the quality of life of Greek citizens (e.g. health, education,
housing, work, social security and pensions). Greece was called to accomplish the
1 Usually referring to Greece, Italy, Portugal, Cyprus and Spain.
2 TROIKA is a committee consisting of the European Central Bank, the European Commission and
the International Monetary Fund, formed to provide financial support and guidance to the Euro‐
zone members mostly struck by the Financial Crisis of 2008.
3 Also known as: Economic Adjustment Programs.
52 Tijdschrift over Cultuur en Criminaliteit 2019 (9) 2
doi: 10.5553/TCC/221195072019009002004
Dit artikel uit Tijdschrift over Cultuur & Criminaliteit is gepubliceerd door Boom criminologie en is bestemd voor Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam 500266
The concept of violence in (times of) crisis
most rapid and large fiscal adjustment on its GDP in the Eurozone.4 As openly
admitted by the IMF, due to wrong calculations and intra-TROIKA disagree‐
ments, the measures implemented during the first years of crisis (approx.
2010-2012) resulted to the magnification of the Greek debt.5 As a result, new
measures had to be implemented including further reductions and cuts in public
spending, practically meaning less support and diminished service provisions
from the state to the citizens. Besides the purely economic (in terms of numeral
calculations) side of the story and the hundreds of reasons that led Greece to face
a severe crisis in 2009, the study of the conflictual relationship which resulted out
of the crisis among all the actors involved – either found at global, regional or
national level – is particularly intriguing.
A term commonly used during the last decade of crisis in the public and political
discourse that indicates the existence of a conflict is the term ‘violence’; used by
citizens in order to support that ‘what we experience is violence’, used by media
to refer to protests and mobilizations that ended in ‘violent clashes between the
police and the participants’, employed by protestors through the use of the old
known (at least for the Greeks) slogan of the radical left ‘violence to the violence
of power’. Both austerity measures introduced by the Greek state and the reaction
of Greek people could be identified as acts which share two common characteris‐
tics; namely, both being political and having a violent nature. The political dimen‐
sion of the aforementioned acts is an easily assigned characteristic considering
that the enforcement of austerity measures reveals a neoliberal political direction
and the reaction of the citizens comes as a stance of opposition. The second char‐
acteristic, namely the violent nature, is often automatically ascribed to the acts of
opposition. However, politico-economic measures are still hardly conceptualized
under theories and concepts used to explain and understand violence.
Based on literature which argues that certain politico-economic measures could
be considered as violent mainly due to their effects on a specified population (see
Galtung, 1969; Farmer, 2004; Cooper and Whyte, 2017; Böhm, 2018), this paper
suggests that austerity could be studied under the conceptual umbrella of vio‐
4 “A record fiscal consolidation by OECD standards has reduced the deficit, pension and health
care reforms have enhanced longer-term fiscal sustainability, and structural reform has
improved labour market flexibility and cost competitiveness. However, the adjustment pro‐
gramme agreed in 2010 between the Greek authorities, the International Monetary Fund, the
European Commission and the European Central Bank has not yielded the expected results in
restoring activity, which has been hit much harder than in other euro zone countries with adjust‐
ment programmes, such as Ireland, Portugal or Latvia (which has a euro peg). This has worsened
the debt problem, despite the debt restructuring that took place in 2012, while unemployment
has sharply increased. Restoring growth, making it sustainable and dealing with social costs are
essential to the success of the adjustment programme.” (OECD, 2013: 3), OECD Economic Sur‐
veys Greece, November 2013, Overview. Retrievable at: www.oecd.org/eco/surveys/
GRC_Overview_Eng_2013.pdf.
5 “The report argues that IMF staff knew imposing a fiscal squeeze on Greece would be especially
painful, but failed to translate that into their growth forecasts, assuming a low ‘multiplier’ from
tax rises and government spending cuts.” (Financial Times, 2013). Retrievable at: www.ft.com/
content/6924ee76-cdfb-11e2-8313-00144feab7de.
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lence. As violence committed by the state through measures and regulations is
often academically termed as institutional violence, the concept of anti-institutional
violence seems to describe the reaction of Greek citizens more accurately than any
other term used for the study of oppositional social action. Accordingly, during
the acute economic recession and political upheaval in Greece, two main forms of
violence seem to have developed, namely institutional (coming from above, the
state) and anti-institutional (coming from below, the citizens). Nevertheless,
structural arrangements should not be neglected in the study of global phenom‐
ena such as the financial crisis and its lived reality. Consequently, due considera‐
tion should also be given to abstracted notions of violence such as structural vio‐
lence.
The paper does not seek to produce a new theory or reconceptualize structural
violence, institutional violence, and anti-institutional violence. Rather, it aims to
discuss the already existing knowledge and put it in context, in an endeavor to
explore how violence could be understood and studied in recent times of crisis
and conflict. The first section, highly inspired by De Haan’s (2008) paper on vio‐
lence as an essentially contested concept, employs a narrow discussion on the exist‐
ing framing of the concept of violence in general. The second section provides a
more analytical understanding on the way the forenamed forms could be per‐
ceived to better fit the context of Greece during the last decade. As a conclusion, a
brief overview of the ideas discussed in previous sections will be provided.
Conceptual framing
Willem de Haan, referring to Gallie’s paper on the essentially contentedness of con‐
cepts (1956), argued that violence falls into the category of concepts that debates
around its substance, definition and methodology can never reach closure (De
Haan, 2008: 29). For almost every scholar that studies violence, it becomes quite
apparent that it is a concept the scientific community will never come to an
agreement about. The only agreement that we can possibly reach in the first place
is that, as Levi and Maguire wisely put, violence is “a slippery term” (2002: 796).
The reasons why violence is a contested concept vary. To start with, it is a concept
that invites various scientific disciplines to study and make sense of it. That leads
to a plethora of approaches, definitions, explanations and methodologies which
in certain instances are inconsistent. Brubaker and Laitin more specifically noted
that “the problem is not that there is no agreement on how things are to be explained; it
is that there is no agreement on what is to be explained, or whether there is a single set
of phenomena to be explained” (1998: 427). Even though there is a disagreement
over the available explanations of violent performances as well, the major prob‐
lem in the study of violence is, indeed, whether certain performances are ‘capable’
of being named violence at the first place.
In his prominent work Violence as an Essentially Contested Concept, Willem de
Haan (2008) offered a valuable outline on (some of) the available definitions of
violence. He is discussing some of the most restrictive as well as the most inclu‐
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sive definitions that are available in the literature. Most of the times the discus‐
sion is around the necessity, or not, of a physical act to be in place in order to talk
of violence, the harm as a necessary outcome and the assigned legitimacy to the
performance under question. The discussion suggests that depending on the form
of violence studied, the three main denominators mentioned above – physical act,
harm, legitimacy – are equally subjected to different analysis and understandings.
For instance, the initial focus on merely violent physical acts is regarded as arbi‐
trary and untenable in studies on structural, symbolic, institutional, cultural and
psychological violence – to name a few examples of non-physical violence (see
Barak, 2003; Schinkel, 2005).
As regards the notion of harm, any suggestion that a performance will only be
considered violent if the harm caused is of a physical nature, in most cases inher‐
ently requires a physical attack to be in place as well. Since in cases of non-physi‐
cal violence the possibilities of having physical harm as an outcome are limited, in
practice we fail to take into consideration a wide pool of non-physical harms
which can still be products of violent performances. Henry noted in his work on
school violence that conventional approaches will inherently hold us liable to
“ignore what some consider to be the equally important hidden crimes of the structur‐
ally powerful in society (Henry and Lanier, 1998), and the symbolic social harms that
deny humanity through violating human rights (Henry and Milovanovic, 1996)”
(Henry, 2000: 18). In the same line of thinking, he also noted by referring to
Bourdieu (1977) that conventional understanding on harm as merely physical,
“First, it excludes the emotional and psychological pain that result from dom‐
ination of some over others. Second, it tends to focus on the visible, inten‐
tional, interpersonal harm between individuals, while excluding harm against
individuals by institutions or agencies. Third, it ignores the violence of social
processes, which produce systematic social injury, such as violence perpetu‐
ated through institutionalized racism and sexism. Fourth, it excludes the
‘symbolic violence’ of domination… (Bourdieu, 1977: 192)” (Henry, 2000: 2).
In the course of this debate, among the most abstracted understandings of harms
that could possibly be the result of violence, are the harms of reduction and the
harms of repression (Henry and Milovanovic, 1996: 103). The former referring to
the action of removing “something from a person’s existing standing as a human
being” whereas the latter “reveal how the exercise of power acts to systematically limit
another person’s capability of achieving higher levels of accomplishment along any of
these dimensions [physical, material, psychological, social and symbolic, moral and ethi‐
cal]” (Henry, 2000: 20). As Henry explained, the aforementioned forms of harm
could be the outcome of actions as well as processes and, could be committed by
individuals as well as communities, organizations, corporations and the state
(ibid.). Thus, violence could be “the use of power to harm another, whatever form it
takes” (ibid: 3).
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Undoubtedly, the introduction of the notion of power to the definition of vio‐
lence is essential, especially in the study of politically relevant violent performan‐
ces. Ruggiero, in his book Understanding Political Violence: A Criminological Analysis
(2006), describes political violence as the violence used to administer key political
objectives and achieve political goals typically aimed to either bring or restrain
social change. As suggested, it can be sponsored and/or committed from the top
level of society as well as the bottom. It can be authorized and unauthorized or,
institutional and anti-institutional. Institutional violence amounts to law-making or
law-conserving violence which through the use of authorized force aims to either
designate a new authority while changing the current system, or to sustain the
already established system and reinforce authority (Ruggiero, 2006: 1 and Rug‐
giero, 2017: 3). On the other hand, anti-institutional violence is characterized by
the use of unauthorized force which as any ‘anti-’initiative aims to oppose estab‐
lished arrangements such as authority (Ruggiero, 2006: 1). What is important at
this stage of the paper is the division between violent performances that make
use of either authorized or unauthorized force. That division is similar to the dis‐
tinction between legal and illegal violence. Since cases where authorized force is
used tend to be characterized already by a degree of legality, they are unlikely to
be easily accepted as cases of violence. In contrast, the concept of legitimacy is
employed by many academics in an attempt to suggest that harm can be the prod‐
uct of legal arrangements as well.
De Haan in his analysis referred to the anthropologist David Riches who in 1986,
even though still referring to physical acts, incorporated into his definition of vio‐
lence the concept of legitimacy. Riches termed violence as ‘‘an act of physical hurt
deemed legitimate by the performer and illegitimate by (some) witnesses’’ (Riches,
1986: 8 in de Haan, 2008). The introduction of the concept of legitimacy is prom‐
ising and could be valuable in the examination of various forms of violence but
then, a rather critical question arises; who determines what is legitimate and on
what grounds? An argument in favour of the examination of violence through the
concept of legitimacy could be that the ‘existence’ of the witness works as a buffer
to ensure that no matter how the performer perceives their actions, if the witness
considers the act as illegitimate then the performer will be held responsible of a
violent performance. However, this argument suggests that violence is “unlikely to
be mistaken” considering that people share a common understanding on what
constitutes of illegitimate performances of violence (de Haan, 2008: 30). By
merely examining violence through the concept of legitimacy we run the risk to
simply play among perceptions; the perceptions of the actors involved since the
judgement of an act as illegitimate or not, will always depend on whether they
share different ethical, moral, ideological, political and social values (see De Haan,
2008: 4-5). Moreover, we run the risk of overlooking that in certain cases the
power dynamics are unequal between actors involved in violent interactions. In
Weberian terms, modern states are monopolizing the use of legitimate violence
(force) thus, no matter the effects or consequences of a violent performance
sponsored by the state, the use of force is always authorized and regarded as legit‐
imate (Weber, [1919] 2015). Bourdieu ([1984] 1988), further developing Weber’s
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concept of the monopoly of legitimate violence, argues that the state monopoli‐
zes symbolic violence as well, through the production and classification of ‘legiti‐
mate identities’ which justify procedures of inclusion and exclusion at a societal
level usually at the expense of certain social groups (see Sapiro, 2015). Accord‐
ingly, the state is not merely monopolizing the use of legitimate violence, but it
becomes the machinery within which violent performances sponsored by certain
social groups are more likely to be regarded as legitimate than violent performan‐
ces sponsored by other less powerful groups. Thus, the state does not merely
enjoy immunity when comes to question its own violent actions but, most impor‐
tantly, it acquires the role of the main ‘witness’ determining who has the capacity
of exercising legitimate violence and on what grounds. However, is the state the
sole actor that has the power to decide what is legitimate or not in specific con‐
texts? Or, could it be said that our current political context is one in which extra-
state actors exert an equal if not greater power than state actors to perform legiti‐
mate violence at the expense of certain social groups? The text will turn to these
questions in the following section.
The most important argument resulting from the discussion thus far, is that the
never-ending process of trying to fit every form of violence under a single defini‐
tion based on strictly conceptualized denominators completely disregards its mul‐
tidimensional and constructed nature. All discussions on what to include or
exclude from the definition of violence miss an important component of the
notion; violence is not merely socially but most importantly politically construc‐
ted – if one can differentiate between the two. Violence is thus a political concept,
insofar as the one who is able to ‘officially and legally’ label a certain perform‐
ance/act/process/situation as ‘violence’ is the one who has the hegemony to
either criminalize it, or make it a common and legitimate practice. At the same
time, the one that is not in a hegemonic position and unable to officially decide
what violence is, still has the capacity to ‘unofficially’ label a performance/act/
process/situation as ‘violence’ and react, opposing the hegemonic understanding
around the notion. Having as a starting point that violence is an empty signifier,
for it can be filled with many meanings depending on who is using it, in which
context and under what circumstances, this paper aims to reopen a theoretical
discussion on the notion of violence along the lines of three very extended con‐
cepts; namely, structural, institutional, and anti-institutional violence.
Conceptual ‘re-framing’ based on contextual specificities
On structural violence
Johan Galtung is not coincidently the name most referred to in every academic
discussion on structural violence. Galtung, in his prominent work Violence, Peace
and Peace Research, marked the beginning of peace and conflict studies. Most
importantly, he introduced a landmark concept in the study of violence that was
meant to change our understanding of who and what is capable of committing
violence. In his paper Galtung advocates on the definition of peace which as he
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noted is not the mere absence of war or conflict, but also the absence of violence
– both direct physical violence and indirect structural violence (Galtung, 1969).
Focusing on his notion of indirect structural violence, it occurs when an unidenti‐
fied actor – meaning not a single human being – commits violence not directly
against an object, but rather, by influencing the available resources, income, edu‐
cation and health at a degree that negatively influences the standard of living
(Galtung, 1969: 171). Numerous scholars have worked on the concept of struc‐
tural violence since the introduction of the concept by Galtung, some offering
very general definitions and some more detailed. For example, Benson defined it
as “social arrangements that systematically bring subordinated and disadvantaged
groups into harm’s way and put them at risk for various forms of suffering” (Benson,
2008: 590). Others defined it as “the systematic exclusion of a group from the
resources needed to develop their full human potential” (Mukherjee et al., 2011: 593).
Accordingly, structural violence is generally understood as an arrangement deeply
rooted in a system of relationships within a socio-economic and political appara‐
tus that results in the restriction of enjoyment of fundamental rights to the
degree that certain social groups are constrained from achieving the quality of life
that would have otherwise been possible. To put it simply, structural violence is
“the violence of injustice and inequity” (Rylko-Bauer and Farmer, 2016: 47). How‐
ever, an important question arises here. What kind of harm needs to be in place
to talk of violence and, more specifically, of structural violence?
The type of harm that needs to be identified in order to speak of structural vio‐
lence is usually referred to as social suffering (Kleinman, Das and Lock, 1997). As
Singer and Erickson noted, while the outcomes of structural violence are “experi‐
enced individually, structural violence targets classes of people and subjects them to
common forms of lived oppression. Hence, the experience of structural violence and the
pain it produces has been called ‘social suffering’” (Singer and Erickson 2011: 1).
Thus, through the term social suffering we talk of the exposition of the linkage
between what is regarded as personal problems with societal and structural prob‐
lems. It captures the lived experience of inequality and injustice that comes
through the restriction of basic human needs (rights) like food, clean water, hous‐
ing, healthcare, through the limitation of employment opportunities or the expo‐
sition to dangerous employment conditions as well as through severe cuts in pen‐
sions and public benefits. In the same line of thought, and especially for the pur‐
poses of this paper, social suffering could also be understood as the detrimental
effects on peoples’ life resulting from “rampant economic inequality, social exclusion,
and persistent poverty arising from the imposition of neoliberal economic policies”
(Sanchez, 2006: 179; see also Quesada, 2009) – namely, structural adjustment
programs often linked to austerity politics and economic disenfranchising. As a
recently published research on the Greek economic crisis highlighted, “in reality,
the consequences of the countermeasures were devastating to the real economy and so
forth to real life. The social cost of the countermeasures was severe, particularly regard‐
ing wellbeing. Many people cannot buy even a loaf of bread or a bottle of milk. Others
search for food in garbage bins and there are many beggars and homeless in the streets.
Recession turned to depression” (Mavridis, 2018: 6). One might argue that this
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quote is overly dramatic and probably not reflecting the Greek reality of crisis.
Certainly, not every Greek citizen struck by the crisis searches for food in garbage
bins. However, stories of people unable to sustain themselves cannot be seen as
purely exceptional. The outcome of austerity measures implemented in Greece in
the last decade was detrimental to the degree that invoking social suffering con‐
stitutes a valid argument. Nevertheless, how does one draw the link between
social suffering and structural violence? To put it differently, how do structural
forces and dynamics/changes found at a micro-societal level relate?
Considering that the imposition of austerity measures was ‘ordered’ by the cur‐
rent politico-economic arrangements that exist on a global scale, the outcomes of
those measures at a societal level are up to a certain degree the product of that
same structure. Accordingly, structure shapes the situations in which individuals
act and experience their everyday life and microstructures are far from isolated;
they are in fact highly influenced by macrostructures in terms of social formation
and reformation, action and reaction. However, the degree of ‘responsibility’
assigned to the structure for changes found at the societal level is again bargained
and discussed through the use of the concept of legitimacy.
Willem Schinkel in his analysis on the contemporary regimes of violence which he
also refers to as regimes of regulation, offered very interesting insights on how the
liberal state employs “a logic of attributing and distributing violence and its legiti‐
macy” that works “as a technique of social sorting, of governing in the medium of vio‐
lence, by ascribing and disavowing each one’s violence” (Schinkel, 2013, 320). Part of
his analysis is based on the argument that liberal states mainly recognize two dif‐
ferent types of violence: private and state violence. While private refers to an active
illegitimate violence performed by individuals, state violence is regarded as the
legitimate reactive form of violence performed as a response to private violence
(Schinkel, 2013: 318-320). His analysis continues through the argument that
there is a third form of violence in contemporary regimes, which completes the
triptych of what he called the trias violantiae, and that form is structural violence.
Referring to Bourdieu’s law of conservation of violence (Bourdieu, 1997: 275 in
Schinkel, 2013: 320), Schinkel explains that structural and symbolic forms are
considered by the liberal state as private illegitimate forms of violence that func‐
tion out of the state’s legitimate use of force. By merely recognizing structural
violence as private and illegitimate, the state actually naturalizes social problems
and ascribes the responsibility for their manifestation to the individual. Home‐
lessness stands as a visceral example of structural violence that is naturalized and
deflected as an individual problem by the state. In that way, the state detaches
itself from any systematize and structural process that brings social injustice, by
assigning the responsibility to individuals who fail to ‘keep up’ and correspond to
current structural arrangements.
In order to counter the argument that social suffering is the result of individual
choices and expose the linkage between what is regarded as personal (private)
problems with societal and structural problems, one should first understand how
institutions restrict the enjoyment of fundamental rights to certain social groups
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to the point that are constrained from achieving a certain quality of life. In the
following section, a discussion on the concept of institutional violence will be pro‐
vided in an attempt to explain how legitimate forms of violence mainly per‐
formed by formal institutions contribute to the manifestation of structural vio‐
lence. More specifically, it will be argued that formal institutions are the way
through which socially harmful arrangements are normalized and become a legiti‐
mate practice irrespective of their effect on specific populations.
On institutional violence
Starting with the term institution, it commonly applies to both social institutions
such as customs, norms or behavior patterns important to a society, and to for‐
mal institutions created by entities such as the government, public services, uni‐
versities, banks etc. Not surprisingly, the notion of institutions can often be con‐
fused with the notion of structure, since they both govern the behavior of indi‐
viduals within a given community. Institutions are often identified as having the
capacity of transcending individuals’ intentions and experiences by mediating the
rules that govern social behavior. However, structure is not simply the mediator,
but the rules themselves; structure is a system. For that reason, it is possible to
argue that institutions work as the medium in terms of communication and exe‐
cution between structural/macro and micro scale dynamics.
Important to this section’s analysis is to highlight that the degree of human
agency embedded in the two often confused forms of violence differs. Galtung’s
original definition of structural violence is characterized by a lack of human
agency. As presented in the previous section, scholars working on structural vio‐
lence merely attempted to link personal suffering with political, social and cul‐
tural arrangements. Galtung was referring to an unidentified actor that shapes
economic, political, religious, cultural arrangements in a way that it produces
social injustice and inequity. Therefore, structure has the power to set some
orders on how those arrangements should work, but a certain degree of acting is
necessary in order to put those orders into force. That degree of acting can be
identified and enforced through institutions. As noted by Winter and Leighton,
structural violence is “embedded in ubiquitous social structures [and] normalized by
stable institutions and regular experience” (Winter and Leighton, 2001: 99).
Depending on the arrangement found at a structural level, normalization or exe‐
cution usually originates in institutions that have authority over the particular
subjects that the arrangement concerns. For example, for the purposes of this
paper the referred structural arrangements concern political and economic poli‐
cies thus, that the main focus at an institutional level will not be on social, but
rather on formal institutions. Formal institutions consist of the government,
public services, banks and any other formal mechanisms responsible for political
and economic rule-making and enforcement.
Getting to the discussion on how institutional violence is conceived for the pur‐
poses of this paper, as Cooper and Whyte put it, “this is a form of violence that can
be understood as a means of force which is not simply acted upon, but organized and
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administered through legitimate means” (2017: 23). It can therefore be understood
as a legitimate form of violence performed by a set of institutions. Cooper and
Whyte described the violence of austerity or, as they said, the violence of politics
– a form of violence that was primarily caused due to decisions taken by institu‐
tions – as “a bureaucratized form of violence that is implemented in routine and mun‐
dane ways” (ibid: 3). As they further noted, formal institutions are not merely
responsible to materialize abstracted politico-economic arrangements, they are,
rather, “the very sites through which highly political strategies like austerity are de-
politicized and their harmful outcome made to appear normal and mundane” (ibid.).
Even though the defenders of austerity praise it as a panacea for economic read‐
justment that would eventually bring development, thus far the implementation
of austere measures during the last decade marked the failure to protect almost
all spheres of Greek citizens’ social life. Austerity is targeting the areas of public
spending that protect the citizens from threats to their wellbeing and quality of
life, unravelling in that way the whole system of social protection. Decisions
related to austerity usually concern privatization, housing, education, public
healthcare, pensions, employment, and public benefits, among other sectors. Phi‐
losopher John McMurty talking on the redistribution of resources from public to
private hands – which, along with the severe public spending cuts, is another side
of austerity politics – noted that “the signifiers of its agent do not disguise the under‐
lying violence of the appropriation – ‘axing social programmes’, ‘slashing public
services’, ‘subjecting societies to shock treatments’ and so on” (McMurty, 1999: 115 in
Cooper & Whyte, 2017: 17). Therefore, those most affected by austerity are not
only struggling under a financial strain. More importantly, they are victimized by
the institutions that are originally in place to protect their rights and secure them
a certain quality of life. Whether the negative outcomes of austerity are measured
by politicians as collateral damage or by economists as negative externalities, it is
time to explore whether the turmoil caused to the lives of thousands of people
affected by austerity had profound violent outcomes up to the point that the
institutions implemented the measures can be identified as having violent capaci‐
ties (Cooper and Whyte, 2017: 3).
Numerous important problems arise with the concept of institutional violence
that need to be addressed. Firstly, to argue and convince that institutions and
people of respect and status act in a violent way towards the people. One of the
reasons that institutional violence differs from other forms is that the central
actors are formal institutions represented by people of respected status, educated
people and, in most cases, people democratically elected by the citizens. As put by
Cooper and Whyte “the violence of austerity is not delivered by ‘street gangs’ or by the
individuals that are typically the focus of public anxieties and tabloid moral panics. The
violence of austerity is delivered by smartly dressed people sitting behind desks” (2017:
23). For exactly the same reason, it is also easier – and up to a certain degree con‐
venient – to assign the responsibility for the negative outcomes of institutional
decisions to the structure. To either blame the invisible hand or to simply stick to
the explanation ‘unfortunately, it is what it is’. Nevertheless, it was not an invisi‐
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ble hand that signed the policy papers, that negotiated for months over the same
policy papers, that defended certain policies, that is still refusing to change plans
when it has been evident for a decade now that austerity is not working.
Given this fact, a second problem emerges, which is normalization of the state of
crisis. If we agree that certain decisions taken by institutions have detrimental
effects on the people we talk of institutional violence, the fact that those deci‐
sions are normalized in the current European and global discourse renders any
argument in favor of considering those decisions as a form of violence impotent.
An advocative factor of this process of normalization, and as a result the failure
to see the ‘violence’ in it, is that the negative outcomes of those decisions are not
always immediately visible. Institutional violence does not always inflict sudden
pain or loss, rather it unfolds over time; in this sense, it can also be understood as
slow violence (see Nixon, 2011). However, it was already a decade ago that auster‐
ity measures started to be implemented, and thus the argument of non-visibility
loses its explanatory power. One might even argue that a decade is enough time
to see whether the detrimental outcome was necessary in order to ‘give a boost’ to
the economy. Unfortunately, this is not happening. On the contrary, the negative
outcomes are deteriorating if not multiplied at a social level. A vivid example is
the high number of claims submitted to the Greek Ombudsman regarding social
security, social welfare, taxation and cases of forced execution for debts to the
state in the years of 2017 and 2018.6
Willem Schinkel criticized social sciences for failing to see other forms of violence
besides the ‘commonsensical’ usage of the concept (which refers to intentional
physical harm) due to analyses that stem back to ‘historical processes of state for‐
mation’ based on the idea that the state enjoys the monopoly of power (Schinkel,
2013: 310, 311). In recent times of political and economic globalization what we
experience is the decentralization of the state, highly impacting its capacity to
monopolize power. The introduction of austerity measures in Greece involved a
variety of actors and institutions found at different ‘scales’; from Troika, which is
a supranational committee, to the local Greek government and other national
institutions. Moreover, besides the national/international binary we also have to
pay due attention to the private/public binary. Banking institutions, private
organizations and corporations also had, if not a saying, a degree of interest over
the introduced measures. Going back to the discussion on whether the liberal
state accepts structural violence as a product of its own way of functioning, the
actual process of decentralization and the involvement of multiple actors in the
decision making process that concern the national as much as the global, works in
favor of the argument that any problem arising at the social level is due to the
personal failure of the individual to cope with current structural arrangements.
As a counter-argument, one might suggest that the introduction of new actors in
the decision making processes does not seem to ‘interrupt’ the old known monop‐
oly of who can perform violence in a legal and legitimate way. Rather, we are now
6 Ετήσια έκθεση του Συνήγορου του Πολίτη για το έτος 2018 (Ombudsman’s office Annual Report
2018). Retrievable at: www.synigoros.gr/?i=kdet.el.ehtisies_ektheseis_documents.559298.
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experiencing an oligopoly of violence where more and more institutions are capa‐
ble of exercising their violent capacities if regarded as necessary. Thus, instead of
accepting that the individual is the one responsible to cope with current struc‐
tural arrangements, we might need to talk of an assemblage of powerful institu‐
tions that make up the ‘new state’ and are equally responsible for negative social
outcomes that might result out of their actions/decisions.
“The very act of law enforcement reproduces violence, albeit a violence of a different
sort and in a different guise” (Schinkel, 2013: 317). During the last decade, the
measures agreed either at national or EU level for the stabilization of the Greek
economy were transformed into national laws and provisions. The citizens were
then called to adapt to this new state of art and comply with the new arrange‐
ments. The enforcement of those measures which aimed towards to the establish‐
ment of a new structure resulted in an immediate response from Greek citizens.
The reaction of the citizens will be discussed in more detail in the following sec‐
tion. However, what is important to note at this point is that their reaction is
being labeled as illegitimate violence while the situation they reacted upon is
(officially) not regarded as violent. The reason is, as discussed already, related to
the legitimacy assigned to each action. Officially imposed measures are a legal and
legitimate means of performing violence no matter their effects on the people
while every reaction towards those measures is usually associated with ‘crime and
violent opposition against authority’ (Ruggiero, 2017: 2). The main point of the
above passage is not to extract any violent aspect of oppositional social action,
but rather to challenge the hegemonic understanding of violent performances
and acknowledge that formal institutions might be the initiators of violent per‐
formances as well.
On anti-institutional violence
Cooper and Whyte, in the introduction of their book The Violence of Austerity,
characterize austerity as a three-part deception. The deceptive logic of austerity is
based on the following three statements: ‘we all played a part in the crisis’, ‘aus‐
terity is necessary’ and ‘we are all in it together’ (2017: 5-15). However, it seems
that people affected by austere measures do not agree with the aforementioned
major statements usually invoked by the advocates of austerity. On the contrary,
the failure to properly support and protect those people exacerbates and gives the
necessary ground for other forms of violence to arise; from collective to individ‐
ual, from oppositional to interpersonal, from gendered, racist to politically
driven. This section will focus on a form that aroused as a response, as a stance of
opposition to the politics of austerity. That particular form of violence could be
termed anti-institutional and it refers to any action which designates unauthor‐
ized force addressed against the authority (see Ruggiero, 2006); a form of vio‐
lence characterized by, or, expressing opposition towards formal institutions. As
Ruggiero noted, referring to Smelser (1963): “it is true that aggrieved people are
always likely to be driven into hostile outbursts, but under certain circumstances it is
the institutions themselves that ‘invite’ people to display hostility” (Ruggiero, 2017:
2). Therefore, the great extent of frustration, anger, distress and insecurity that
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came as an aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis led to the genesis of individual
actors as well as movement groups in the neoliberal critical juncture that had as a
scope to attack and challenge government choices and decisions.
At this point, I would like to narrowly discuss the reason why I chose the term
anti-institutional and not resistance to conceptualize oppositional social action
during the years of crisis in Greece. As it happens with the concept of violence,
resistance lacks conceptual clarity (Hollander and Einwohner, 2004: 533) result‐
ing in the use of this term for the conceptualization of a very wide pool of actions
(see also Hayward and Schuilenburg, 2014). Anti-institutional violence is a form
of resistance as it is a form of political violence; however, it stands as a very spe‐
cific resisting and violent form considering that the target of its actions is overly
explicit for every actor involved. Observing the situation in Greece over the last
years and referring to the available literature on the mobilizations of 2010-2015
it seems that intentions and perceptions of their actions are not necessarily
shared among participants. However, what they do share, is the target that their
actions are directed to, and that target is formal institutions and anything they
represent. Thus, without extracting the resisting aspect of anti-institutional vio‐
lence I do believe that its use as a concept is more accurate and provides the ana‐
lytical specificity necessary for a deeper understanding of the actions to be dis‐
cussed as well as of their interactive relation with other forms of violence presen‐
ted in previous sections of this paper.
Mostly, critics of austerity argue that the way policies are designed target the
most vulnerable and marginal groups in a society (Cooper and Whyte, 2017: 10).
Even though this argument is correct, it simply marks the starting point of the
social downturn caused by the crisis. In 2010, when the first mobilizations were
fueled in Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain, the people participating were
mostly low class – the first victims of austerity (Della Porta, 2017: 10). However,
the people affected by austerity were not only those traditionally regarded as the
vulnerable or marginal. The consequences of austerity were devastating to such a
degree that alongside the groups usually found at the lower layers of a society, the
middle class faced changes of historical proportions as well. That led to the sec‐
ond phase of mobilizations initiated in 2011, which was highly inspired by the
Arab Spring, the Occupy movement and the occupation of Tahrir Square in Cairo
(Karyotis and Rüdig, 2017: 4). The European movements of the Spanish Indigna‐
dos and the Greek Aganaktismeni marked the rise of the so-called middle-class
movements (Della Porta, 2017: 10) or, the movements of squares (see Diani and
Kousis, 2014; Kaika and Karaliotas, 2014). The second phase lasted for a couple of
months, making way for a third phase characterized by “diffused contention across
the societal sphere” (Vogiatzoglou, 2016: 1). The fourth and final phase of mass
mobilizations against austerity in Greece is attributed to the period between
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approximately 2012-2015, where as reported street protesting deteriorated, and
focus was mostly attributed to social solidarity structures7 (ibid.).
What is important for the purposes of this paper is that especially after the sec‐
ond phase of mobilization people participating to oppositional movements and
actions did not form a homogeneous group in terms of class division, political
ideology, age, education, gender or in terms of mobilization/protesting experi‐
ence (see Simiti, 2016: 42; Vogiatzoglou, 2016). Some groups belonged to the
anarchist scene, some to the radical left, some to a traditional leftist party, some
to the center-right, to the far right and others were called independent. The non-
homogeneity of the group does not merely support the extent of frustration
caused due the introduction of austerity measures, it equally reflects the chaotic
nature of the situation, leaving the people wondering as to where in the political
spectrum they can find shelter against socio-economic oppression. A vivid exam‐
ple is the rise of leftist parties like Syriza in Greece, Podemos in Spain, Bloco de
Esquerda in Portugal and La France Insoumise in France during mobilization
against austerity in Europe – in an attempt to find an ‘alternative’ political party
that would overturn decisions of previous governments (see Della Porta et al.,
2017). Nevertheless, it simultaneously signified the rise of far-right movements
and parties. For example, the rise of far-right organization Golden Dawn and its
succession as a parliamentary party, was marked at the very beginning of the eco‐
nomic crisis in Greece. One of the reasons – not the only reason – of its succes‐
sion is that they openly participated in anti-austerity mobilizations, while also
organizing various events and gatherings to help people (merely Greeks) that
were facing economic problems.
Ideological and class configuration do not stand as typical characteristics of
movements of crisis. As evident from the above discussion, not every anti-auster‐
ity movement in Europe has broken out entirely from below, they are not charac‐
terized by an entirely independent/autonomous nature, they are not representing
a specific class in society and they do not always share a common ideological
basis. One might even argue that movements in crisis are dysmorphic. As Antonio
Negri recently said about the most recent example of a movement of crisis, the
French ‘Gilets Jaunes’, “what we have here is an artificial movement, a contradictory
movement, divided internally along territorial, generational and class lines, among
many others; what unifies it is the refusal to negotiate, the refusal to take a chance on
the existing political structures”.8 This ideological and class heterogeneity not only
proves the extent of opposition, but it most importantly proves the severity of
the social harm caused by austerity, negatively influencing the quality of life of
7 Social solidarity structures usually refer to the establishment of social grocery stores, of social
pharmacies and the provisions of meals, clothes and house supplies to people unable to sustain
themselves and their families. Along those actions, some movements were also providing help to
people in need of legal support for cases concerning their employment or housing.
8 Verso Books, French Insurrection: Antonio Negri on the Gilets Jaunes and the new wave of pro‐
tests in France. Retrievable at: www.versobooks.com/blogs/4158-french-insurrection.
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numerous social groups, of social groups that prior to the crisis were considered
as having nothing in common.
The discussion on anti-institutional movements has a couple of important impli‐
cations when introduced to a theoretical discussion on violence. To begin with,
even though Kerbo (1982) noted that movements of crisis usually tend to end in
violent outbursts, not every movement and not every anti-austerity initiative
ended up being violent. It is important to know how the anti-austerity mobiliza‐
tions developed, however, in our analysis we need to be careful when distinguish‐
ing between violent and non-violent outbursts, unless we clarify what we term as
violence – a discussion that leads back to the first section of this paper. It is true
that in most cases and especially at moments of vast mobilizations, clashes with
the police and cases of vandalism against public and private property were widely
reported. Whether those performances were initiated by some members of pro‐
testing groups or came as a response to state repression through the police is
debatable. What is interesting for the purposes of this paper which discusses vio‐
lence, is that exploring the available literature on social movements, protests and
violent kinds of contestation, I came across a number of discussions presenting
those initiatives as common violence sponsored by radical groups (usually referring
to anarchists) thus, studied under the theories of radicalization and terrorism.
As evident from the discussion above, it is time to challenge the notion that anti-
institutional violence merely comes from radicalized, organized groups of people
who have a long-term strategy. Rather, it is suggested that violent outbursts in
such instances should be conceptualized under theoretical concepts of political
violence that refer to widespread social action and resistance, avoiding a rushed
causal link with terrorism and political extremism. In the end, what is discussed
in this section is the action of people against authority who are not normally
mobilized; of people that are neither representatives of specific social classes nor
of specific groups known to traditionally struggle. Thus, even in cases where
mobilizations ended in violent outbursts, there is a chance that the actors
involved were possibly not the so-called ‘known’ initiators or people with prior
experience in violent confrontations. Through analyses that consider any violent
outburst as an act of radicalism, the capacity of other non-radicalized groups of
people to violently perform if they consider it necessary is underestimated. Simul‐
taneously, the degree of responsibility of the state in leading non-radicalized peo‐
ple to violently perform in order to show their opposition is eliminated. One
might even argue that by adopting this analysis we extract the agentic element of
people that perform anti-institutional violence. The possibility of them intention‐
ally (whatever that term entails and however it is being understood) initiating a
violent interaction with the state should not be neglected nor undermined.
Going back to the analysis of Schinkel on the contemporary regimes of violence,
the use of illegitimate violence by people is usually regarded as an active violence
towards which the state reactively responses through the use of legitimate vio‐
lence (Schinkel, 2013: 319). For the purposes of the discussion presented thus far
in this paper, if we consider institutional violence as the one that preceded in
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time and anti-institutional as the response, then institutional violence is the
active and anti-institutional the reactive. However, the state made use of its legit‐
imate capacity to use violence against people during mobilizations through police
repression, which is equally reactionary in nature as the people’s reaction towards
austerity politics. Thus, the discussion as developed suggests that whether vio‐
lence is being labelled as legitimate/illegitimate, active/reactive is a matter of
political construction, and viewpoints change based on who is the actor/initiator
of a violent performance. Simultaneously, it highlights the interactive nature of
violence which is highly communicative rather than co-existing. With the
acknowledgment of the interactive element of violence it is not suggested that
the analysis should be based on a causality that promotes a linear understanding
of how violent performances escalate, or that one form necessarily precedes the
other. Rather, the focus is on the existence of a violent system of interaction
which confirms the existence of structural violence while it brings every other
form of violence closer, explaining how they materialize at the same context dur‐
ing the same period of time.
Conclusions
Violence can take various forms and be identified as such based on the examina‐
tion of different denominators. It could be an act, an omission, an arrangement, a
process, an ideology. The aforementioned examples could be examined and iden‐
tified as violence depending on their legality, legitimacy, visibility, brutality,
means, outcomes or motives. In an endeavor to widen our field of vision and
incorporate into the study of violence forms of non-physical nature or subject to
non-physical outcomes – either committed by institutions and structures or by
people opposing them – we need, as Jackman suggested, to free ourselves from
inconsistencies of former discussions on violence and start looking at actions
integral to social life that are possibly of a violent nature, however, traditionally
not understood or studied as such (Jackman, 2002: 387). This paper is not meant
to “report in other writers … reluctance, or ineptitude, to resolve the confusion and put
things straight” regarding the concept of violence (Bauman, 1995: 139). I, myself,
choose to follow the ‘dominant pattern of not defining violence’ either (Maguire
et al., 1997 in Schinkel, 2013: 311). The aim of this paper is rather to highlight
the political, cultural and interactional dimensions of violence, not only as a con‐
cept but most importantly as a nature.
Social movement studies, conflict studies, criminology, political sociology and
political philosophy have produced a useful toolkit of concepts that deal with dif‐
ferent forms or expressions of structural, institutional and anti-institutional
forms of violence. However, we still lack the knowledge to holistically understand
the state of art in times where the power dynamics are changing on every level of
the society at a high degree and speed. As argued, we still miss further develop‐
ments in terms of how certain forms of violence are expressed and committed in
recent times through politico-economic measures as well as the connection
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between neoliberal policies and the decline in civic and political rights that could
possibly lead to a violent social action towards formal institutions.
Since in real life the forms of violence are fluid and not so easily delineated, this
paper stands as a suggestion to re-evaluate our understanding of firstly the
notion of each form separately as well as to bring the discussed forms together
and suggest that they communicate and interact at a higher degree than the
already existing academic scholarship suggests. Forms to be found at different
levels of action are studied as if they are quite apart from each other. However,
they are not isolated, neither in terms of characteristics and motives nor in terms
of interaction. The one nourishes and sustains the other and their interaction is
highly communicative rather than co-existing. In the end, what all these ‘actors’
have in common is the context, the situation they are trapped in; the framework
within which they act, they interact and occasionally re-act. If that situation is
violent in nature, their interaction will inescapably be violent as well. Using as a
closure a passage from Louis Édouard’s novel History of Violence, “The problem is
not … that in any interaction you have been forced into one or the other behavior, but
that you have been forced to stay within the context of that interaction, within the
scene imposed by the situation” [Το πρόβλημα δεν είναι … ότι εντός μιας
οποιασδήποτε αλληλεπίδρασης έχεις εξαναγκαστεί στη μία ή την άλλη
συμπεριφορά, αλλά το ότι έχεις εξαναγκαστεί να μείνεις εντός του πλαισίου αυτής
της αλληλεπίδρασης, εντός του σκηνικού που έχει επιβληθεί από την κατάσταση]
(Louis, [2016] 2019).
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